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INTRODUCTION 
The European Community for Coal and Steel (Paris, 1951), 
as well as the European Economic Community and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (Rome, 1957), were created 
first and foremost to secure peace and prosperity in Europe.2 
Western Europe, to be precise, since the Central and Eastern 
European Countries ("CEECs") were already prevented from 
participating by the onset of the Cold War and their location in 
the part of Europe that Churchill had so generously ceded to 
,Stalin in Moscow and Yalta in 1944 and 1945.3 
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l. See Ralph Nader, Green Party Presidential Candidate, Wasting Your Vote, Wast-
ing Our Democracy (Aug. 23, 2000), http:/ /www.ratical.org/ctrglobalize/RalphNa-
der /082300.html. 
2. See ToNY JuoT, PosTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 157-58 (2005). 
3. Churchill's strategy of buying Russian goodwill and acquiescence of British 
dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean with territories in Central and South Eastern 
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Western European integration achieved its primary pur-
poses rather handsomely and by the mid-l 980s, the Member 
States of the Communities were not only experiencing an un-
precedented standard of living but war between the arch-ene-
mies Germany and France had become unthinkable.4 But then 
came the end of the Cold War and the challenge of extending 
peace and prosperity to all of Europe. In this respect, the brutal 
war that accompanied Yugoslavia's dismemberment from 1991 
to 1999,5 right in the backyard of the European Union ("EU"),6 
provided a horrible reminder that in Europe peace must never 
be taken for granted. 
Pursuant to the same logic that prevailed when Jean Mon-
net and Robert Schuman reached out to Germany after the end 
of World War II,7 and in keeping with the promise made in the 
Preamble of the founding treaty,8 the EU now reached out to 
Europe that were not his to give has been well documented. On the so-called "Percent-
ages Agreement" see, for example, Rov JENKINS, CHURCHILL: A BIOGRAPHY 759-60 
(200l);JuDT, supra note 2, at 101; Richard M. Ebeling, Covering the Map of the World: The 
Half-Century Legacy of the Yalta Conference, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM FouNDATION, http:/ 
/www.fff.org/freedom/0495b.asp. In January 1945, before going to Yalta, Churchill 
supposedly said "[m]ake no mistake, all the Balkans, except Greece, are going to be 
Bolshevised, and there is nothing I can do to prevent it. There is nothing I can do for 
Poland, either." JuDT, supra note 2, at 100. 
4. See, e.g., Desmond Dinan, Fifty Years of European Integration: A Remarkable Achieve- , 
ment, 31 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1118, 1118 (2008). Indeed, (Western) Europe has never 
before experienced a period of more than five decades without any major wars. See 
Cristobal Alvarez, A Military History Timeline Of War And Conflict Across The Globe 
3000 B.C. To A.D. 1999, http://www.warscholar.com/Timeline.html (last visited Nov. 
1, 2008) (based on GEORGE C. KOHN, DICTIONARY OF WARS (1999)). 
5. "Between 1991 and 1999 hundreds of thousands of Bosnians, Croats, Serbs and 
Albanians were killed, raped or tortured by their fellow citizens; millions more were 
forced out of their homes and into exile ... [there were] massacres and civil war on a 
scale not seen since 1945." JuDT, supra note 2, at 665. For the magisterial work on 
Yugoslavia's troubled political history see SABRINA P. RAMET, THE THREE YuGOSLAVIAS: 
STATE BUILDING AND LEGITIMATION 1918-2005 (2006); for historic background see also 
REBECCA WEST, BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON: A JOURNEY THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA 
(1941). 
6. Although technically not correct until the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, 
the term "European Union" shall be used throughout this article instead of "European 
Community" for activities under the European Community Treaty ("ECT"), and the 
proper "European Union" activities under the Treaty on European Union ("TEU"). 
7. See JuoT, supra note 2, at 156-57. 
8. The original Preamble of the 1957 ECT reads as follows: 
DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, 
RESOLVED to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries 
by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, 
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Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and 
offered integration.9 In recognition of the difficulties for the EU 
on the one side of absorbing a large number of countries with-
out jeopardizing the functioning of the institutions, and the dif-
ficulties for the CEECs on the other side of transforming them-
selves into modern democracies with rule of law and functioning 
market economies, a number of pre-conditions for accession 
and a number of support schemes for the transformation were 
established. 
The present Article analyzes those pre-conditions that were 
supposed to promote the development of rule of law, as well as 
those schemes that were intended to support this development. 
It concludes that first, the concept of "rule of law," although 
often quoted, is poorly defined and understood and this is an 
obstacle for countries aspiring to build a system based on rule of 
law. Second, Western support for the transformation in Central 
and Eastern Europe was and continues to be a combination of 
trial and error with a lack of appreciation of historic precedent 
and lessons. 
I. EVERYBODY AGREES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT 
FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE-
BUT WHAT IS ''RULE OF LAW?" 
Although everybody talks about it all the time, few people 
have provided and, indeed, few people seem to be able to pro-
vide a clear definition of what is meant by "rule oflaw."10 There-
AFFIRMING as the essential objective of their efforts the constant im-
provement of the living and working conditions of their peoples 
RESOLVED by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen 
peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal 
to join in their efforts. 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community pmbl., Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 (emphasis added). 
9. As Jacques Delors, former President of the EU Commission said, "Si nos genera-
tions ne repondent pas au devoir qui est le leur aujourd'hui, d'etendre leurs valeurs de paix et de 
comprehension mutuelle d !'ensemble de !'Europe, elles failliront devant l'histoire." Jacques 
Delors, opening Session, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 15, 17 (Eur. 
Comm'n ed., 1998). 
10. The lack of a clear understanding of "rule of law" has been widely acknowl-
edged. See, e.g., Hague Inst. For Internationalisation of Law, 2007 Rule of Law Inventory 
Report (2007), available at http://www.hiil.org/uploads/File/l-947-Ru1e_of_Law_Inven-
tory_Report_2007.pdf [hereinafter Rule of Law Inventory Report]. The report includes a 
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fore, the first Part of this Article will be an attempt at a compre-
hensive and workable definition that should make future discus-
sion of the subject less fuzzy and support more effective efforts at 
promoting "rule of law" in certain countries and parts of the 
world, including but not limited to Central and Eastern Europe. 
What may be the first modern and systematic analysis of the 
concept of "rule of law" was provided by the famous English ju-
rist A.V. Dicey in his landmark book INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF THE LAw OF THE CONSTITUTION in 1885. 11 Dicey identi-
fies three essential elements of "rule oflaw," namely: (1) no per-
son can be punished or "lawfully interfered with" by the public 
authorities unless the person is in breach of the law and that any 
and all such interference by the government in private affairs 
must be authorized by law; (2) no person is above the law and 
that everyone, regardless of rank and status, is subject to the full 
range of the ordinary laws of the land, and finally; ( 3) there is an 
essential set of rights of the person based on general principles 
of law, whether or not they are also expressed in the form of a 
bill of rights. 12 As we will see, this definition remains remarkably 
useful today. 
Historically, the principle of rule of law evolved in opposi-
tion to arbitrary governance, either by a totalitarian ruler or 
king, or by the mob. Hence it expresses first and foremost the 
notion that nobody is above the law and that not only the people 
but even their government must follow predetermined and pub-
licly available rules. 13 The U.S. State Department, one of the big-
bibliography on "rule of law" of almost 100 pages. Id. at 34. "Rule of law" is not alone in 
this fate it seems. "Good governance" is another concept that is much used and little 
defined. See Friedl Weiss, Transparency as an Element of Good Governance in the Practice of 
the EU and the WTO: Overview and Comparison, 30 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1545, 1547 (2007). 
11. See generally A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAw OF THE Cc>N-
STITUTION (10th ed. 1961), available at http://www.constitution.org/cmt/avd/law_con. 
htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
12. See id. at 187-203. 
13. For early examples see the MAGNA CARTA chs. 38-40, imposing certain limits on 
King John of England, in particular with regard to the writ of habeas corpus, and the 
philosophy embodied in SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEX, REx, OR, THE LAw AND THE PRINCE: 
A DISPUTE FOR THEJusT PREROGATIVE OF KING AND PEOPLE (1843) in which he reverses 
the previous paradigm of Rex Lex. Rutherford is said to have been influential on 
Locke and America's founding fathers. See JOHN CoFFEY, POLITICS, RELIGION AND THE 
BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: THE MIND OF SAMUEL RUTHERFORD 12 (1997). By contrast, the 
absolute or absolutist monarch is exemplified by Louis XIV (1638-1715). the sun king, 
who supposedly said ofhimself"l'Etat, c'est d moi," "the State is me," or "I am the State," 
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gest sponsors of "rule of law" promoting projects around the 
world, claims that, 
The rule of law suggests that if our relationships with each 
other (and with the state) are governed by a set of relatively 
impartial rules-rather than by a group of individuals-then 
we are less likely to become the victims of arbitrary or authori-
tarian rule. Note here that the political obligation implied by 
the rule of law applies not only to the rights and liberties of 
subject and citizen but also with equal claim to rulers and 
governors. By precluding both the individual and the state 
from transcending the supreme law of the land, the framers 
[ of the Constitution] constructed a protective layer over indi-
vidual rights and liberties. 14 
Other sources and organizations emphasize the significance 
of a separation of powers and a system of checks and balances 
between them. Equality before the law, democratic elections, 
and free media are also often quoted as essential elements of the 
rule of law, although this would seem to conflate or confuse de-
mocracy and rule of law. The following is also from the U.S. 
State Department: 
The rule of law is a fundamental component of demo-
cratic society and is defined broadly as the principle that all 
members of society-both citizens and rulers-are bound by 
a set of clearly defined and universally accepted laws. In a 
democracy, the rule of law is manifested in an independent 
judiciary, a free press and a system of checks and balances on 
leaders through free elections and separation of powers 
among the branches of government. 
Although a written constitution is not a necessary compo-
nent of democracy-for example, Great Britain does not have 
one-in the United States, the rule of law is based primarily 
on the U.S. Constitution and on the assurance that U.S. 
laws-in conjunction with the Constitution-are fair and are 
applied equally to all members of society. 1" 
See Herbert H. Rowen, "L'Etat C'est d Moi": Louis XIV and the State, 2 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 
83, 83 (1961). 
14. Greg Russell, Constitutionalism: American and Beyond, http://usinfo.state.gov/ 
products/pubs/democracy/dmpaper2.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
15. See Alexandra Abboud, The Rule of Law Provides Foundation for Democracy (Jan. 
18, 2006), http://www.america.gov/ st/washfile-english/2006/January /20060118165 
638maduobbA8.491153e-02.html. 
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It is doubtful whether Washington's traditional emphasis on 
democracy, which can almost be summarized as "first introduce 
democracy and everything else will take care of itself," is indeed 
the best approach to the promotion of "rule of law" in other 
parts of the world. At the very least, this emphasis would seem to 
alienate the current government in an undemocratic country. 
Instead of working with the powers that be for gradual change 
and the development of "rule of law," Washington confronts un-
democratic governments and labels them as the primary prob-
lem, thus denying them the opportunity to become part of the 
solution.16 
Yet other sources and organizations target the importance 
of the judiciary for the rule of law. For example, the Center for 
the Rule of Law in Boston 17 declares that 
The nature of the judicial system is critical to the rule of law. 
Impartial judges, governed by clear legal rules, committed to 
enforcing the rules as written, independent of political influ-
ence are essential if law is to be a reliable guide to individuals 
and a constraint on those in power. The process for ap-
pointing judges to the courts needs to be removed from the 
realm of ordinary politics, where attention is focused exces-
sively on a judge's supposed ideology rather than on demon-
strated competence and propriety. It is necessary if legal 
rules are to be meaningful that judges are committed to ap-
plying laws written by others faithfully, and it is fair to ask if 
nominees to the courts have conducted their professional 
lives in a manner consistent with an expectation that they 
would perform the law application task assigned to our judici-
ary. It is not, however, proper to ask nominees to signal that 
they would support particular outcomes in certain cases. Ju-
dicial activism-the use of a judge's power to invent novel 
legal requirements that suit personal policy preferences 
rather than established legal commands-undermines the 
rule of law. So does the demand that judges barter implicit 
promises on future decisions for confirmation votes. In addi-
16. For further analysis see Frank Emmert, Market Economy, Democracy, or Rule of 
Law? What Should Be Prioritized to Promote Development?, in CHALLENGING BouNDARIES: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF Ro LAND BIEBER 104 (2007). 
17. The Center is an independent academic research center chaired by Ronald A. 
Cass, the Dean Emeritus of Boston University School of Law, former Vice-Chairman of 
the United States International Trade Commission, and Chairman of the Federalist 
Society Practice Group on International Law and National Security. See Center for the 
Rule of Law: About Us, http://rule-of-law.us/about/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
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tion to the judges, the rules governing the operation of the 
courts, the sorts of suits that courts will entertain, and the 
procedures used all affect the vitality of the rule of law. 18 
Again, we will have to see whether the judiciary does indeed 
play such a preeminent role when it comes to rule of law and, 
more importantly, which other elements of a legal system have 
to be in place to enable the judiciary to play the role assigned to 
it in this passage. In this respect, it will be argued that "rule of 
law" is first and foremost in the hands of the public administra-
tion and that the courts can only play the role of goalkeepers 
after the rest of the team has failed in its duties. 
Then there are sources that seek to establish a necessary 
link between "rule of law" and good governance. 19 The World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund-and many others 
involved in law and development20-have long held that without 
"rule of law" economic development will not and cannot be sus-
tainable.21 Consequently, these organizations have introduced 
18. Center for the Rule of Law: Judicial System, http:/ /rule-of-law.us/issues/judi-
cial-system-international-business-trade/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the problems burdening the appointment of judges in the United States see 
Symposium, Jurocracy and Distrust: Reconsidering the Federal Judicial Appointments Process, 
26 CARDozo L. REv. 331 (2005), with contributions by over a dozen nationally recog-
nized scholars. 
19. See, e.g., Declaration of GS Foreign Ministers on the Rule of Law, http:/ /www. 
mofa.gojp/policy/economy/summit/2007/gSdec.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). For 
academic analysis see, for example, Harry Seldadyo et al., Governance and Growth Revis-
ited, 60 KYKLos 279 (2007) (with further references). 
20. On the "Law and Development Movement" of the 1960s and 1970s, see, for 
example, David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and 
Future, in THE NEW LAw AND EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74 (David 
M. Trubek et al. eds., 2006), available at http:/ /www.law.wisc.edu/facstaff/trubek/Rule-
ofLaw. pdf [hereinafter Trubek, Development Assistance]; Elliot M. Burg, Law and Develop-
ment: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of "Scholars in Seif-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. 
CoMP. L. 492 (1977);John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the 
Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 
457 (1977); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Seif-Estrangement: Some Reflec-
tions on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 
1062 (1974); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Note, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 
89 A,'vl. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995). 
21. See generally Rule of Law Inventory Report, supra note 10; Press Release, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, IMF Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato's Statement at the Con-
clusion of his Visit to Chile (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http:/ /www.imf.org/ external/ 
np/sec/pr/2004/pr04185.htm. These forces received a powerful boost with the fall of 
Communism and the beginning of reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, which led to 
the emphasis on "rule of law" in the transformation process and ultimately the present 
Article. 
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conditions into their financial aid packages that require adher-
ence to key elements of "rule of law."22 
The World Bank23 has used different definitions for the 
term over time, and it is worth examining those a bit more 
closely. During the 1990s, while Ibrahim Shihata was General 
Counsel of the World Bank, "rule of law" meant that: 
a) [T] here is a set of rules which are known in advance, 
b) such rules are actually in force, 
c) mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the 
rules and to allow for departure from them as needed accord-
ing to established procedures, 
d) conflicts in the application of the rules can be resolved 
through binding decisions of an independent judicial or arbi-
tral body, and 
e) there are known procedures for amending the rules when 
they no longer serve their purpose.24 
More recently, however, after Ko-Yung Tung became Gen-
eral Counsel of the World Bank in 2000, the definition of "rule 
of law" has shifted into the following: 
(1) the government itself is bound by the law; 
(2) every person in society is treated equally under the law; 
(3) the human dignity of each individual is recognized and 
protected by law; and 
( 4) justice is accessible to all. 
The rule of law requires transparent legislation, fair laws, pre-
dictable enforcement, and accountable governments to main-
tain order, promote private sector growth, fight poverty, and 
have legitimacy.25 
What is immediately apparent is how Shihata's definition is 
22. See, e.g., Memorandum from The European Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 
Political Aspects of the Mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment 4, http:/ /www.ebrd.com/pubs/insti/aspects.pdf. 
23. Barron estimates that the World Bank has spent some US$2.9 billion on some 
330 projects promoting "rule of law" around the world between 1990 and 2005. See 
Gordon Barron, The World Bank & Ru/,e of Law Reforms, 9 (Dev. Studies Inst., London 
Sch. of Econ. and Political Sci., Working Paper No. 05-70, 2005), availab/,e at http:// 
www.Ise.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP70.pdf. 
24. IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE v\'ORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELEcrED ES-
SAYS 85 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991). 
25. THE WORLD BANK, LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL 
REFORM 2-3 (2004), http:/ /www-wds.worldbank.org/ external/ default/vVDSContent-
Server/WDSP /IB/2004/03/01/000012009_20040301 l 42827 /Rendered/PDF /250820 
040Edition.pdf. 
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technical and neutral, while Tung's definition (re-)introduces a 
variety of values and a considerable measure of vagueness. 26 
Some open-ended questions may illustrate the point: what is 
''.justice?"27 What are "fair laws?" What is "legitimacy?" Can a 
government promote "rule of law" without promoting "private 
sector growth?" What is the standard to be applied for "human 
dignity" and equality? Is this a Western standard or a universal 
standard? If it is universal, is the position of women in some 
Islamic societies compatible with it?28 Finally, do we need to 
open these cans of worms before we can have useful and eff ec-
tive promotion of "rule of law?" Or do we risk overburdening 
the "rule of law" and turning it into the victim of its own success? 
Similar to Ko-Yung Tung, yet other sources consider "rule of 
law" as conditio sine qua non for the protection of human rights 
and in particular the enforcement of rights. 29 
26. In this context, Barron distinguishes formal definitions, which rely on objec-
tively verifiable criteria and do not require adherence to any particular set of morals or 
values, from substantive definitions, which include the formal criteria but also insist on 
substantive qualities. See Barron, supra note 23, at 14. 
27. On this point see, inter alia, Stathis Banakas, A Global Concept of justice-Dream or 
Nightmare? Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or Righteousness Competing in Today's 
World, 67 LA. L. REv. 1021 (2007). 
28. Lest the reader jump to conclusions such as, "of course it is unacceptable that 
women are still not allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia," I shall give a more subtle exam-
ple. Arab names frequently contain references to fathers, grandfathers and great 
grandfathers. See Patronymic-Arabic, http:/ /en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patronymic# 
Arabic (last visted Nov. 1, 2008). For example, the full name of an Egyptian by the 
name of Mohamed may well be Mohamed Ahmed Ali Mohamed, with the second, 
third, and fourth names referring to his male ancestors in direct line. The same rule 
applies to women, i.e., the full name of Mohamed's wife may well be Fatima Ismael 
Mohamed Ahmed, with her second, third, and fourth names referring to her male an-
cestors in direct line. At least in Egypt, it is not possible for either of them to include 
the names of their mothers, grandmothers, or great grandmothers in their name. This 
may seem discriminatory to readers in Western countries. However, we find a similar 
system of patronymic surnames in Lithuania where the daughter of Paulauskas will have 
the last name Paulauskaite ("daughter of Paulauskas") until she gets married to 
Adamkus, at which point her last name will become Adamkiene ("wife of Adamkus"). 
See Lithuanian Name-Patronymic, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithuanian_name# 
Patronymic (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). Similar patronymic systems of names continue to 
exist in Iceland and the Faroe Islands. See Icelandic Name, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/lcelandic_name (last visited Nov. I, 2008). In Iceland, if Jon Stefansson ("Jon, son 
of Stefan") gets married to Katrin Vilhjalmsdottir ("Katrin, daughter ofVilhjalm"), their 
daughter will have the last name Jonsdottir and not Katrinsdottir, and their son will be 
Jonsson and not Katrinsson. See also Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Infor-
mation on Icelandic Surnames, http://eng.domsmalaraduneyti.is/information/nr /I 25 
(last visited Nov. I, 2008). 
29. For a good overview, see Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: 
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Most recently, a number of different organizations from dif-
ferent parts of the world have pooled their resources into the 
World Justice Project, "a multinational, multidisciplinary initia-
tive to strengthen the rule of law worldwide. "30 One of the activi-
ties of the World Justice Project is the compilation of a world-
wide "Rule of Law Index" in which the organizers hope to in-
clude one hundred countries in the next three years. 31 The 
Index is supposedly going to be "the first index that examines 
the rule of law comprehensively [ while o] ther indices cover only 
aspects of the rule of law, such as human rights, commercial law, 
and corruption."32 The following elements will be evaluated: 
• The government and its officials and agents are accounta-
ble under the law. 
• The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect 
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and 
property. 
• The process by which the laws are enacted, administered 
and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient. 
• The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by 
competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement offi-
cials, attorneys or representatives, and judges who are of 
sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the 
makeup of the communities they serve.33 
Given the broad range of organizations and individuals 
from different disciplinary backgrounds, the broad range of the 
criteria to be taken into consideration is hardly surprising. The 
question that needs to be asked, and hopefully answered, is 
whether this is not getting unnecessarily comprehensive and 
complicated. Arguably, the criteria are not only hard to measure 
but the organizers may well find numerous shortcomings even in 
the most developed countries and may end up with results that 
show that although some countries have more problems than 
others, nobody is perfect. This in turn may actually provide ex-
cuses for some of the worst of the perpetrators along the logic "if 
What'.s- the Relationship?, 36 Gw.J. INT'L L. 809 (2005); see also JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, 
UNITED NATIONS SAN=IONS AND THE RULE OF LAw (2007). 
30. About the World justice Project, http://www.abanet.org/\\jp/about.html (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
31. See The World justice Project, Rule of Law Index, http:/ /www.worldjusticepro-
ject.org/rule-of-law-index (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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even the United States does not do this or that, how can we pos-
sibly be expected to do so?" 
Last but not least, the "rule of law" has also been made re-
sponsible for the proper functioning of a market economy.34 In 
this context we can identify an important movement that empha-
sizes private property rights as a key component for the develop-
ment of a market economy and links effective protection of such 
private property rights with "rule of law."35 
If the "rule of law" is a bit of everything to everyone, this 
would seem to explain at the same time its popularity as a slo-
gan, 36 as well as the fact that the concept is increasingly in dan-
ger of becoming so vague as to become useless.37 This raises the 
34. This can be traced as far back as Max Weber. See Trubek, Development Assistance, 
supra note 20, at 74; see generally MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAw IN EcoNOMY AND 
Soc1ETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein, trans., 1954). 
35. Interesting work in this direction has been initiated by Professor Robin P. Mal-
loy, Director of the Center on Property, Citizenship, and Social Entrepreneurism at 
Syracuse University College of Law. See Center on Property, Citizenship, and Social En-
trepreneurism, http:/ /www.law.syr.edu/ academics/ centers/ clbe/ pcse.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2008). The link is also supported by the so-called theory of "New Institutional 
Economics," which has identified poor protection of private property rights as one of 
the most important factors hampering development and growth. See, e.g., Douglass C. 
North, The New Institutional Economics and Development (Economics Working Paper 
Archive ("Econ\VPA"), Working Paper No. 9309002, 1993), available at http:// 
129.3.20.41 / eps/ eh/papers/9309 /9309002. pdf. 
36. Brian Tamanaha, in his landmark study, On the Rule of Law, concludes that 
governments around the world can agree on very little these days, possibly less than 
ever before. Certainly there is no agreement about essential elements of democracy 
outside of Western democratic states, and any and all attempts at a universal catalog of 
human rights have either failed or resulted only in rather vague and non-binding decla-
rations. Yet there seems to be one thing that everybody is able to endorse, namely that 
"rule of law" is a good thing and that it benefits everyone. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON 
THE RULE OF LAw: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1 (2004). For a good overview of the 
literature on "rule of law" see generally Rule of Law Inventory Report, supra note 10. An 
equally good overview of organizations and projects around the world promoting "rule 
of law" is provided in The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of 
Law at the National and International Levels, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ 
63/64 (Mar. 12, 2008), available at http:/ /www.un.org/ ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol 
=A/63/64. 
37. Barron wrote that 
[T]he [rule of law] is put forward as the solution for an astonishingly wide 
range of problems: it poses as the link between fledgling and consolidated 
democracy; it promises to entrench human rights; it promises an end to vio-
lence and corruption; and it is a sine qua non for the foundations of a market 
economy. But with meanings as diverse as these, one could be forgiven for 
thinking that the [rule of law], in the end, means nothing at all. 
Barron, supra note 23, at 2-3. The reader should note a difference in diction. While 
Barron uses active language, i.e., the rule of law promises this or that, I have used passive 
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question whether there is a way-or whether there are ways-of 
defining "rule of law" in more tangible and useful ways without 
falling into the trap of allowing-or even encouraging-the in-
strumentalization of "rule of law" by particular interests,38 con-
verting "rule of law" into "rule by law."39 
First, we need to recall the important distinction between 
horizontal relations of private individuals or entities among each 
other, and vertical relations of private individuals or entities with 
the public administration or state authorities. "Rule of law" is 
really about the latter, protecting the individual in her relations 
with the authorities and demanding that all levels of government 
always respect the law. More than anything, "rule of law" is 
therefore about administrative law. A further step at conceptual 
analysis is provided by Paul Craig, who emphasizes "the distinc-
tion between formal and substantive meanings of the rule of 
law."40 In essence, he concludes as follows: 
Formal conceptions of the rule of law address the manner in 
which the law was promulgated (was it by a properly 
authorised person, in a properly authorised manner, etc.); 
the clarity of the ensuing norm (was it sufficiently clear to 
guide an individual's conduct so as to enable a person to plan 
his or her life, etc.); and the temporal dimension of the en-
acted norm (was it prospective or retrospective, etc.). Formal 
conceptions of the rule of law do not however seek to pass 
judgment upon the actual content of the law itself. They are 
not concerned with whether the law was in that sense a good 
law or a bad law, provided that the formal precepts of the rule 
of law were themselves met.41 
Subsequently, Craig discusses substantive standards "based 
language, i.e., the rule of law is expected to deliver this or that, indicating that I see the 
rule of law more as a victim of unrealistic expectations than a con artist. 
38. As Brian Tamanaha has pointed out, "[)Jacking its own internal values or goals, 
law will become an instrument of those who control and set the goals of the state." 
Tamanaha, supra note 20, at 474. For an even more scathing indictment of certain 
abuses by the West of the promotion of "rule of law" see generally Uco MATTEI & LAURA 
NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAw IS ILLEGAL (2008). 
39. On the latter, see the very interesting study in RuLE BY LAw: THE Pouncs OF 
CouRTs IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008). 
40. Paul P. Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework, 1997 Pus. L. 467, 467 (1997). See also the attempt at developing a "rule of 
law" "framework" in Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 
ADMIN. L. REv. 647, 653-68 (2008). 
41. Craig, supra note 40, at 467. 
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on, or derived from, the rule of law"42 that can be used to ana-
lyze whether a law is indeed good or bad. Pursuant to Craig, the 
formalists, like Joseph Raz, reject substantive value criteria be-
cause they would merely restate the obvious, namely that good 
laws are better than bad ones.43 Consequently, Raz emphasizes a 
distinction between rule of law and other values, such as "democ-
racy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human 
rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of 
man."44 By contrast, proponents of a substantive approach to 
"rule oflaw," such as Ronald Dworkin, demand that "rule oflaw" 
must include these essential values, that there cannot be "rule of 
law" without widespread respect for and enforcement of these 
values.45 Although Craig's analysis of the two approaches to 
"rule of law" may bring some structure to the discussion, it is also 
clear that it does not introduce any new elements but mainly 
launches a debate whether the coin has one or two sides. 
In my view, the formal approach to "rule of law" is as under-
inclusive as the substantive approach is over-inclusive. In other 
words, the formal approach is not sufficiently ambitious and 
could get more out of "rule of law" than just formal legitimacy. 
At the same time, the substantive approach is overly ambitious 
and burdens "rule of law" with everything that comes in the 
broadest sense under democracy, justice, human rights, and 
good governance, with the inevitable result of premeditated fail-
ure. A "middle way" discussed by Craig tries to avoid the 
shortfalls of either approach, and indeed brings us somewhat 
closer to a clearer, more effective, and thus more useful defini-
tion of "rule oflaw." Here is another quote from Craig's seminal 
article: 
[In a more recent book by Joseph] Raz the core idea is the 
"principled faithful application of the law." The major fea-
42. Id. 
43. See id. at 468. See also the discussion by Craig of Dicey's concept of "rule of 
law" in Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framewark at 
470-74 and the critical approach taken by Roberto Mangabeira Unger at 474-77. Craig 
counts both of these, together with Raz, as representatives of the formal approach to 
"rule of law." See id. at 468, 470, 474. 
44. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 LAw Q. REv. 195, 196 (1977). 
45. Craig cites Ronald Dworkin, in particular RoNALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 
(1986), and RONALD DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE (1985), as a representative of 
the substantive approach to "rule of law." See Craig, supra note 40, at 477-79. Support-
ing the latter are also Sir John Laws and Trevor Allan. See id. at 479-84. 
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tures are "its insistence on an open, public administration of 
justice, with reasoned decisions by an independent judiciary, 
based on publicly promulgated, prospective, principled legis-
lation." The principle of the rule of law is addressed to the 
courts, legislature, and also other bodies such as the police 
and administrative authorities.46 
This definition opens a new way of looking at "rule of law" 
that is not a traditional part of the Anglo-American discourse 
and instead can be traced back, inter alia, to Hans Kelsen. 47 It 
finds its modern day manifestations in the administrative law tra-
ditions of France and Germany.48 It rests on three pillars:49 first, 
any level of public administration, from the head of state and 
government, legislature, and constitutional or supreme court, to 
the lowest level of civil servant, requires a legal basis for any deci-
sion, decree, ruling, or action that actually or potentially affects 
the interests of any party outside of the public administration 
and/ or uses public resources (" Vorbehalt des Gesetzes," liberally 
translated as "requirement of legal basis") .50 Second, every deci-
sion, decree, ruling, or action, as well as every legal basis, has to 
be in conformity with every higher norm in the respective legal 
system ("Vorrang des Gesetzes," liberally translated as "requirement 
oflegality") .51 Third, every decision, decree, or action of the ex-
ecutive that directly affects the interests of any party outside of 
the public administration must be reviewable by an independent 
46. Craig, supra note 40, at 484 (quoting JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC Do-
MAJN: ESSAYS ON THE MORALl1Y OF LAW AND POLITICS 373-74 (1994)). 
47. See HANs KEI.SEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAw 221-319 (Max Knight trans., 1978). It is 
not surprising that Joseph Raz should be influenced by Kelsen. In his doctoral thesis he 
dealt at length with Kelsen's theory of legal system and also a comparison between 
Kelsen and Jeremy Bentham. See JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 44-120 (1970); see also R.C. VAN 
CAENEGEM, LEGAL HISTORY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 185-200 (1991). 
48. See generally Arie Jansse Bok, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions fry the Dutch 
Administrative Courts: Recours Objectif or Recours Subjectif? A Survey Including French and 
German Law, in JuDictAL LAWMAKING A,"ID ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 153 (F. Stroink & E. van 
der Linden eds., 2005); L. NEVILLE BROWN &JoHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 
(5th ed. 1998); MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: IN COMMON LAw 
PERSPECTIVE ( 1985). 
49. In an earlier study, I added "sufficient transparency of the political process" 
and "free and investigative media" as a fourth pillar. See Emmert, supra note 16, at 116. 
However, I do not consider these elements as central to "rule of law." Instead, they are 
part of a larger concept of Rechtsstaat because they protect the functioning of the politi-
cal rather than the legal system. 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
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judiciary for conformity with the first and second principles in a 
procedure that follows minimum standards of due process and 
results in a reasoned and published decision ("Rechtsschutz-
prinzip," liberally translated as "requirement of judicial review" 
or "access to justice") .52 I shall argue that if these three princi-
ples are observed, there is "rule of law" and there is no need for 
more specific or comprehensive criteria. However, the three 
principles need to be explained and illustrated in turn. 
The "requirement of legal basis" rests on the assumption 
that all power inherently belongs to the people and any author-
ity in a state or society draws its powers from the people. This 
means that by default, all powers are with the people, the gov-
erned, unless they have been explicitly transferred by the people 
to their government.53 In addition to the basic transfer of pow-
ers to the government as laid down by the people in their consti-
tutions,54 in modern states such a transfer is usually done in the 
formal ways of representative democracy, i.e., the people vote for 
their elected representatives and the parliament then adopts the 
respective legal bases for administrative and other acts. Without 
such a transfer, however, there is no power of the government 
and any binding decision, decree, ruling, or action of the gov-
ernment that does not rest on a direct or indirect transfer of 
power from the people in the form of a legal basis is ultra vires.55 
If the legal basis of an act is an administrative decision or circu-
lar or any other delegated authority below the level of a law of 
52. See id. 
53. Interestingly, this idea is by no means limited to Western, let alone Judeo-
Christian societies and constitutions. On the basis of many passages in the Qur'an, for 
example the 159th verse of the third surah and the 38th verse of the 42nd surah, many 
Islamic scholars have concluded that "government by consent and council, must be 
regarded as one of the fundamental clauses of all Qur'anic legislation relating to state-
craft." THE MESSAGE OF THE QuR'AN 92 n.122 (Muhammad Asad ed., 1980); see also 
MUHAMMAD AsAD, THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE A.'1D GoVERNMENT IN ISLAM 44-47 (1961). 
54. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States"); GRUNDGESETZ 
[GG] [Constitution] pmbl. (F.R.G) ("the German people, in the exercise of their con-
stituent power, have adopted this Basic Law"). 
55. By contrast to the present author, the majority of German commentators seem 
to limit the "requirement of legal basis" to important acts of the public administration, 
in particular those that interfere with fundamental rights of individuals, which require a 
legislative basis, while unimportant acts do not have to be based on an act of parlia-
ment. See Jost Pietzcker, Vorrang und Varbehalt des Gesetzes, jURISTISCHE ScHULUNG 710 
(1979); Christoph Gusy, Der Vorrang des Gesetzes, juRJSTISCHE ScHULUNG 189 (1983). 
There is no contradiction, however, since the concept of legal basis is wider than the 
concept of legislative basis. 
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parliament, this legal basis itself has to be traceable to its own 
legal basis and ultimately to a legislative basis. This means that 
not every legal basis has to be a legislative basis but every legal 
basis ultimately bas to be grounded or based on a legislative ba-
sis, which in turn rests on a constitutional basis. 
The "requirement of legality" is simply the "idea that the 
administration must be compelled to observe the law"56 where 
"the law" means any norm that is binding and applicable in a 
given case. This introduces !he concept of the hierarchy of 
norms. In this hierarchy, the individual and specific administra-
tive act or decision has the lowest rank. 57 On the next higher 
level is the organizational or institutional rule on which the indi-
vidual administrative act was based.58 For example, the police 
officer demanding entry into a private residence for purposes of 
search and seizure (an individual and specific administrative act) 
performs her duties pursuant to an order given by a command-
ing officer or prosecutor. The commanding order is usually 
based on a ruling by an independent judge or a court order, 
which in turn is given in implementation of a more general legis-
lative act that permits forcible entry for purposes of search and 
seizure in a number of strictly defined cases.59 The legislative act 
itself has to be in conformity with the constitution, however, and 
in particular the provisions on privacy and the protection of pri-
vate property and family life that will be found more or less 
clearly defined in the respective bill of rights. 6° Finally, the con-
stitutional guarantees, as worded in general and interpreted in 
specific cases, must conform to whatever norms of international 
law are applicable to the situation at hand, whether by nature of 
ratification by the respective state of an international agreement 
such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, or because that state is bound by other norms 
of international law, in particular those derived from customary 
international law.61 The hierarchy of norms and the "strictly le-
56. BROWN & BELL, supra note 48, at 213. 
57. See Peter L. Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages of Globalization and Information: What 
America Can Learn from Eur<>jJe, and Vice-Versa, 12 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 645, 648 (2006). 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See, e.g., Gerrit Betlam & Andre Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public International 
Law and Eur<>jJean Community Law Before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of the 
Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EuR. J. forr'L L. 569 (2003); Eric Stein, International 
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gal pedigree,"62 i.e., the unbroken chain of legality, leads to two 
specific obligations: first, the administrative officer has to actu-
ally apply the specific laws applicable to a case at hand; second, 
she is prohibited from breaching the specific law or any of the 
applicable higher laws or norms. 
The "requirement of judicial review" by an independent ju-
diciary is an emanation of the separation of powers and the idea 
of checks and balances. The doctrine that every act of every 
state authority that directly affects the rights and/or obligations 
of third parties must be open to judicial review pursuant to a 
general principle of law (" le respect de la legalitl'') was established 
by the French Conseil d'Etat in 1950.63 In Germany, Article 
19 ( 4) of the Basic Law of 1949 provides as follows: "Should any 
person's rights be violated by public authority, he may have re-
course to the courts."64 This provision has consistently been 
broadly interpreted by the German Constitutional Court.65 A 
very clear illustration can also be found in the case law of the 
European Court of Justice.66 Although the European Parlia-
ment had not been mentioned as a possible applicant or defen-
dant in the respective procedural provision, the Court held that 
[T]he European Economic Community is a Community 
based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member 
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question 
whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity 
with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty. [The respec-
tive articles of] the Treaty established a complete system of 
legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court 
of Justice to review the legality of [any] measures adopted by 
Law in Internal Law: Toward Internalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions?, 88 
AM.j. INT'L L. 427 (1994). 
62. See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FoRSITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 20 (8th ed. 
2000). 
63. Conseil d'Etat (CE) [Highest Administrative Court] Feb. 17, 1950, 86949 (Fr.), 
available at http:/ /www.lexinter.net/JPTXT2/arret_ministre_de_1'agriculture_c_dame_ 
lamotte.htm. 
64. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 19 § 4 (F.R.G). 
65. See, e.g., Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] 35, 263 (F.R.G); id. 41, 23, id. 60, 253. 
66. For an early analysis see W. Paul Gormley, The Significant Role of French Adminis-
trative jurisprudence as Presently Applied lry the Court of the European Communities, with Empha-
sis on the Administrative Law Remedies Available to Private Litigants, 8 S.D. L. REv. 32, 32-36 
(1963). 
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the institutions.67 
Several conditions have to be fulfilled in order to make this 
judicial review effective. It is widely understood thatjudicial re-
view cannot function unless certain minimum standards of due 
process and transparency are guaranteed.68 However, I am argu-
ing that the traditional standards like independence of the judi-
ciary, competent and impartial judges, and equality of arms 
before the courts are not as central as commonly presented. 
The primary function of the courts in administrative law is the 
enforcement of the first and second pillars of "rule oflaw." First, 
the administration has to provide and the courts have to review 
the legal basis of the act in order to verify that the administration 
was empowered to act in a given case. If the administration does 
not or cannot provide a legal basis, the act is null and void ac-
cording to the requirement of legal basis. The same is true if 
there is a legal basis but it does not support the act in question. 
Second, the courts must verify whether the contested act is in 
conformity not only with its legal basis but with all applicable 
rules of law. Unless there is an unbroken chain of legality, all 
the way up to constitutional and international guarantees of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the act is illegal and 
has to be undone or compensated. To enforce the requirement 
of legal basis and the requirement of legality, the courts merely 
have to properly subsume the facts of the case under all applica-
ble rules of law. And this in turn can be secured via two formal 
conditions: access to the courts has to be guaranteed to any indi-
vidual with a prima facie claim; and any decision of the courts 
has to be fully reasoned and published for review by the parties, 
any appellate level jurisdiction, and the interested public, in par-
ticular the media as well as any academic commentators. Last 
but not least, a corollary of the "principle of judicial review" is 
the principle of administrative liability, i.e., the obligation of the 
administration to end a violation of individual rights or interests 
67. Parti ecologiste "Les Verts" (Fr.) v. European Parliament, Case 294/83, (1986] 
E.C.R. 1339 'lI 23. This principle would be violated, for example, if the Bush administra-
tion could successfully claim that its activities outside of U.S. territory, whether in Iraq 
or in Guanatanamo Bay, are not subject to judicial review by U.S. courts. 
68. See, e.g., Claudia Tobler, Note, The Standard of judicial Review of Administrative 
Agencies in the U.S. and EU: Accountability and Reasonable Agency Action, 22 B.C. lr-.'T'L & 
COMP. L. REv. 213, 215-19 (1999). 
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found by a court in a judgment that becomes res judicata and to 
make good any damages unlawfully inflicted. 
It is my conviction that these relatively few and simple pre-
conditions are enough to develop "rule of law" not only in 
CEECs seeking or having recently obtained EU membership, but 
in any country around the world, with the sole exception of fail-
ing states where there is neither rule nor law but only chaos. 
This conviction is based on the assumption that systems meeting 
these pre-conditions or criteria become self-regulating or auto-
poietic. 69 In other words, rather than looking for foolproof sys-
tems, as seems to be the goal of the World Justice Project, I am 
advocating systems that acknowledge their inherent faults, in 
particular human faults such as the occasional biased or cor-
rupted judge, and provide mechanisms to correct these faults. 
Constitutions are usually beautiful documents that promulgate 
respect for human rights,justice, and equality even in otherwise 
quite undeveloped countries.70 And even where they have gaps 
or ambiguities, international law can often supplement the nec-
essary guidance. Therefore, if the public administration cannot 
act without a constitutional legal basis and all acts must be 
strictly legal in light of the constitution and any applicable 
norms of international law, gradual evolution of "rule of law" 
depends only on effective legal remedies. And if the courts have 
to grant access and have to explain what they are doing to en-
force the "rule oflaw," national and international public opinion 
will over time lead to better and better decisions. This process 
may be slow and it may not protect every injured party but even 
the bad examples will still serve a purpose. 
In the next Part, we shall examine to what extent the pre-
conditions of "rule of law" as here presented were part of the 
conditions of accession for the candidate countries and to what 
extent-if any-the EU supported this kind of development of 
"rule of law." 
69. On the concept of autopoietic social systems see Nnu.AS LUHMANN, EssAYS ON 
SELF-REFERENCE 1-20 (1990). The application of Luhmann to law has been accom-
plished by Gunther Teubner. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAw AS A.'I AuTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 
(Zenon Bankowski ed., Anne Bankowska et al. trans., 1993). 
70. A fine example is the modern and democratic 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. 
See generally PAKISTAN CoNST., available at http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitu-
tion (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
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II. EU SUPPORT FOR THE TRANSFORMATION IN CEEC's 
AS SUPPORT FOR "RULE OF LAW?" 
During the Cold War, the European Union had very limited 
relations with the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. For 
a long time, the EU in Western Europe and the Comecon71 in 
Central and Eastern Europe did not even recognize each other, 
leaving bilateral relations to the level of the Member States.72 
Only after the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, did 
relations between the two economic organizations begin to nor-
malize and direct negotiations were initiated.73 As the reform 
process in the Soviet Union gained momentum and the CEECs 
gradually regained their full sovereignty, these countries rapidly 
sought closer relations with the EU and with the Member States 
of the EU.74 The communist leadership in Hungary, seeking to 
appease pressure for reform, began negotiations with demo-
cratic reform movements and started with the removal of its for-
tifications along the border with Austria in May 1989.75 The 
trickle of East Germans escaping via Hungary to the West grew 
rapidly.76 Against the background of economic decline and 
striking workers, a weakened communist leadership in Poland 
accepted round-table talks with representatives of the Solidarity 
labor union as early as February 1989 and after the elections in 
June 1989 the first non-communist government in the region 
71. "Comecon" stands for Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also abbrevi-
ated as CMEA. For more information on this Soviet-dominated counterpart to the Eu-
ropean Economic Community ("EEC"). See Comecon, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Comecon (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
72. See generally Barbara Lippert, EC-CM.EA Relations: Normalisation and Beyond, in 
EUROPE'S GLOBAL LINKS: THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNI"IY AND INTER-REGIONAL CooPERATION 
119 (Geoffrey Edwards et al. eds., 1990). 
73. Official relations were established in June 1988. See Legislative Resolution em-
bodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the Commis-
sion of the European Communities to the Council for a decision on the conclusion of 
the Joint Declaration on the establishment of official relations between the European 
Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA"), 
OJ. C 187/148 (1988). 
74. See generally Lippert, supra note 72. 
75. See juDT, supra note 2, at 609-10, 612. Hungary had ratified the UN Conven-
tion on Refugees in March 1989. See Status of Ratifications for Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Feb. 5, 2002), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2 
ref.hun. 
76. See J VDT, supra note 2, at 612. 
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came to power in Poland in September 1989.77 During the same 
month, some 30,000 East Germans managed to escape via Hun-
gary and via West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw, put-
ting enormous pressure on the communist governments in 
Czechoslovakia and in East Berlin. 78 This exodus only grew in 
October and the communist leadership in East Germany finally 
resigned as the Berlin Wall was broken down in November.79 
More than anything, this event marked the fall of the iron cur-
tain and the reunification of Europe.80 
The EU did its share to bring about and support the early 
reform movements in Central and Eastern Europe.81 At the 
Rhodes European Council in December 1988, the heads of state 
and government of the twelve Member States took a strategic 
decision to develop economic cooperation and to provide eco-
nomic aid to those CEECs who were embarking on a reform 
course.82 This approach was reinforced at the Strasbourg sum-
mit in April 1989, when the heads of state and government de-
cided to coordinate their national strategies for the development 
of relations with CEECs and to speak with one voice in this re-
gard.83 In June 1989, the Vice President of the European Com-
mission, Frans Andriessen, declared in Moscow that the EU 
would use all policy instruments available to it to promote the 
reforms in CEECs and this invitation was accepted by Gorbachev, 
who spoke of a new Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals at a 
speech before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in July of 
77. See id. at 606-07. Solidarity had won all 161 contested seats in the Parliament 
(Sejm) and 99 out of JOO seats in the Senate. See id. at 607; see also PUSHING BACK THE 
BOUNDARIES: THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CENTRAL AND EAsTERN EUROPE 328-30 (Mike 
Mannin ed., 1999) (delineating events in timeline format). 
78. SeejuDT, supra note 2, at 612-13. 
79. See id. at 610-16. Other important events include the installation of the first 
non-communist government in Prague in December 1989 and the violent overthrow of 
communist dictator Ceaucescu in Romania during the same month. See id. at 616-26. 
80. For an excellent analysis of the period, see TIMOTHY GARTON AsH, IN EuROPE's 
NAME: GERMANY AND THE DIVIDED CONTINENT 343-56 (1993) andjuDT, supra note 2, at 
585-633. 
81. For a good overview see, for example, Antoaneta Dimitrova, The Role of the EU 
in the Process of Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, in 
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 9, at 315. 
82. See European Council, Rhodes, 2 and 3 December, 21 E.C. BuLL., no. 12 at 8-
13 (1988), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/l483/0l/rhodes_june_l988.pdf. 
83. See European Council, Strasbourg, 8 and 9 December, 22 E.C. BULL., no. 12 at 
8-18 (1988), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/l395/0l/Strasbourg_1989.pdf. 
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that same year.84 The heads of state and government of the 
Group of Seven ("G7") then decided to set up economic support 
programs for Hungary and Poland and the European Commis-
sion launched its famous Poland and Hungary: Assistance for 
Restructuring their Economies ("PHARE") program.85 In paral-
lel, the first bilateral agreements on trade cooperation between 
the EU on the one side and Poland and Hungary on the other 
side, were signed in late 1989 and 1992 respectively.86 From 
there, it was a short way to the first association agreements with 
CEECs that, unlike earlier agreements of association with other 
countries,87 explicitly stipulated the goal of eventual member-
84. See Money, Business Roundup, Soviet-EC Talks Planned, WASH. TIMES, June 9, 
1989, at Cl. Gorbachev actually used the words "We are thinking of an all-European 
home as a community rooted in law." Mikhail Gorbachev, Address given to the Council 
of Europe (July 6, 1989), available at http:/ /www.ena.lu/mce.swf?doc=11160&1ang=2. 
85. See Council Regulation No. 3906/89, OJ. L 375/11 (I 989), availahl,e at http:// 
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31989R3906:EN:HTML. 
PHARE stands for "Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Econo-
mies." See The Phare Programme And The Enlargement Of The European Union, EuR. 
PARL. Doc. (PE 167.944) 4 (1998), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en1arge-
ment/briefings/pdf/33a1_en.pdf. For the first year, 1990, financial aid of 300 million 
Euro was approved. This program was subsequently expanded to cover all ten CEECs 
that have since become members of the EU and was updated annually. See id. Albania,_ 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia at one point also benefited from PHARE aid, but 
have since, together with the other successor states of the former Republic of Yugosla-
via, received their own program, "Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Develop-
men t and Stability in the Balkans" ("CARDS"). See Council Regulation No. 2666/2000, 
OJ. L 306/1, available at http:/ /eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ: 
L:2000:306:0001:0006:EN:PDF; Marc Maresceau, Pre-accession, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF 
THE EuROPF..AN UNION 9, 35 (Marise Cremona ed., 2003). 
86. See Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Polish 
People's Republic on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, OJ. L 339/2 
(1989), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
21989Al 122(01):EN:HTML; Interim Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Hungary, of the other part, on trade and trade-related matters, OJ. L 116/ 
2 ( 1992), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexU riServ /LexU riServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:21992A0430(03):EN:HTML; Commission Decision of 27 February 1992 con-
cerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Coal and Steel Community of the 
Interim Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European 
Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other 
part, on trade and trade-related matters, OJ. L 151/25 (1992), available at http:// eur-
lex.europa.eu/Lex U riServ /Lex U riServ.do?uri=CELEX:31992D0289: EN: HTML. 
87. The only earlier association agreement that stipulated the goal of membership, 
albeit only after a lengthy transitional period, was the 1964 Agreement establishing an 
Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, OJ. 217 /3687 at 
art. 28 (1964), available at http:/ /www.cfcu.gov.tr/files/ Ankara_Anlasmasi.doc. 
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ship in the EU.88 At the European Council in Copenhagen in 
June 1993, the heads of state or government of the EU Member 
States "agreed that the associated countries in Central and East-
ern Europe that so desire shall become members of the Euro-
pean Union,"89 an invitation that was received with enthusiasm 
in the CEECs. Multiple applications for membership in the EU 
followed suit.90 
At the time when the CEECs applied for membership in the 
EU it was quite clear that both the candidate countries them-
selves and the institutional structure of the EU would need sub-
stantial reforms before the enlargement could be completed.91 
Without these reforms or with incomplete preparation, an en-
largement to the East could have done more damage than good. 
Already the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, therefore, 
formulated a number of conditions to be achieved before acces-
sion: 
88. See, for example, the Europe Agreement establishing an association between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Hungary, of the other part, OJ. L 347/271 (1993), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexU riServ /LexU riServ.do?uri=CELEX:21993Al 231 ( 17) :EN :HTML. 
This agreement was signed on December 16, 1991 and, after ratification by the twelve 
Member States of the EU and by Hungary, entered into force on February 1, 1994. See 
EUR-Lex Database, Dates, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=l 95678:cs&lang=en 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
89. See European Council in Copenhagen: Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93 
REV 1, at 13 (1993), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/ 
docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf [hereinafter European Council in Copenhagen]. 
90. Hungary was first to apply in March 1994, followed by Poland in April 1994. 
Romania and Slovakia applied in June 1995, Latvia in October 1995, Estonia in Novem-
ber 1995 and Bulgaria and Lithuania in December 1995. Finally, the Czech Republic 
applied in January 1996 and Slovenia in June 1996. See]oHN O'BRENNAN, THE EASTERN 
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 190 n.7 (2006). 
91. To get an idea about the institutional problems of enlargement, with regard to 
issues such as translation and interpretation to and from the new languages, buildings, 
etc., see Commission of the European Communities, Administrative Preparations for 
Enlargement: Objectives and Practical Arrangements: Working Paper from the Com-
mission Staff, SEC (2001) 1319 Final Quly 2001), available at http:/ /aei.pitt.edu/4399/ 
01/001826_1.pdf; Guido Podesta, Preparing for the Parliament of the Enlarged Euro-
pean Union, PE 305.269/BUR/fin (Sept. IO, 200l);John Peterson, Enlargement, Refonn 
and the European Commission: Weathering a Perfect Stonn?, 15 J. EuR. Pus. PoL'v 761 
(2008). Regarding the institutional capacity and issues of decision-making see, for ex-
ample, In golf Pernice, Institutional Settlements for an Enlarged European Union, in LAw AND 
GovERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 3 (George A. Bermann & Katharina 
Pistor eds., 2004); Eric Philippart and Monika Sie Dhian Ho, Pedalling Against the Wind: 
Strategies to Strengthen the EU's Capacity to Act in the Context of Enlargement (Scientific Coun-
cil for Gov't Policy, Working Paper No. 115, 2001), available at http://www.wrr.nl/en-
glish/ con ten tjsp?objectid=3205. 
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Membership requires that the candidate country has 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes 
the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of member-
ship including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union. 
The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while 
maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also 
an important consideration in the general interest of both 
the Union and the candidate countries.92 
It would be beyond the scope of the present Article to ana-
lyze all of the conditions in any kind of detail. 93 Instead, the 
focus shall be on democracy, rule of law, and "the ability to take 
on the obligations of membership." The latter, in particular, has 
been interpreted as the ability to apply the acquis communautaire, 
i.e., the rights and obligations enshrined in the general princi-
ples of law, the founding treaties, the regulations, directives and 
decisions forming the secondary legislation in force, as well as 
the international agreements, and the case law of the European 
Court of Justice, that together constitute the body of law that we 
commonly call "EU law."94 This means in addition to various 
political and economic reforms,95 the CEECs had to undergo a 
process of institutional and legal reform encompassing five cen-
92. See European Council in Copenhagen, supra note 89, at 13. 
93. It would also be quite unnecessary, as there are many good publications on the 
subject. See, e.g., HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT: A COMMENTARY ON THE EN-
LARGEMENT PROCESS (Andrea Ott & Kirstyn Inglis eds., 2002); Tibor Palankai, From Eu-
rope Agreements to Membership: What Criteria Should be met and the Prospects of Meeting Them, 
in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 9, at 339; Roger J. Goebel, 
joining the European Union: The Accession Procedure for the Central European and Mediterra-
nean States, l Lov. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 15 (2003-04). 
94. See Frank Emmert, Introducing EU Competition Law and Policy in Central and East-
ern Europe: Requirements in Theory and Probkms in Practice, 27 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 642, 642 
n.l (2004). 
95. The literature on economic reforms in CEECs is vast. See, e.g.,JIM ROLLO, Eco-
nomic Aspects of EU Enlargement to the East, in ENLARGING THE EUROPEAN UNION: RELA-
TIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND CENTRAL AND EAsTERN EuROPE 252 (Marc Maresceau ed., 
1997); Roland Sturm, Markus M. Muller &Jurgen Dieringer, Economic Transformation in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Towards a New Regulatory Regime?, 7 J. EuR. PuB. PoL'v 650, 
650-62 (2000). 
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tral elements: ( 1) constitutional reform;96 (2) legislative reform; 
(3) court reform; (4) administrative reform; as well as (5) re-
form of legal education.97 We shall now examine by what means 
the European Union supported the candidate countries in these 
reforms and to what extent the support actually encouraged the 
development of "rule of law." 
As pointed out, the first expression of admission criteria be-
yond the laconic language in the Treaties came out of the Co-
penhagen European Council in 1993. However, it did not go 
beyond generalizations such as "stability of institutions guaran-
teeing democracy, the rule of law [and] human rights" as well as 
"the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of member-
ship."98 The same is true for the Essen European Council of 
1994, which at least instructed the Commission to come up with 
a White Paper on enlargement.99 In the same tradition of being 
vague and general, in December 1995, the Madrid European 
Council concluded that the "the pre-accession strategy . . . will 
have to be intensified in order to create the conditions for the 
gradual, harmonious integration of those States, particularly 
through the development of the market economy [and] the ad-
justment of their administrative structures .... "100 Similar declara-
tions followed in six month intervals at every European Council 
as sure as one season follows after another.101 
96. See CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL LAw IN CENTRAL AND WTERN 
EUROPE (Rein Mullerson et al. eds., 1998); WoJCIECH SADURSKI, Transitional Constitution-
alism: Simplistic and Fancy Theories, in RETHINKING THE RuLE OF LAw AFTER COMMUNISM 9 
(Adam Czarnota et al. eds., 2005); Istvan Pogany, Constitutional Refonn in Central and 
E.astemEurope: Hungary's Transition to Democracy, 42 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 332 (1993); Eric 
Stein, Post-Communist Constitution-Making: Confessions of a Comparatist (Part /), l NEW 
EuR. L. REv. 421 (1993). 
97. See generally Goebel, supra note 93. 
98. See generally European Council in Copenhagen, supra note 89. 
99. See European Council, Essen, 9 and 10 December, 27 E.C. BULL., no. 12 at 22 
(1994), availahle at http://aei.pitt.edu/l447/0l/Essen_Dec_1994.pdf. 
100. European Council, Madrid, 15 and 16 December, 28 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 18 
(1995) (emphasis added), availahle at http://aei.pitt.edu/l452/0l/madrid_dec_1995. 
pdf. For a detailed history of the European Council meetings and other steps in the 
pre-accession phase see PHEDON NICOLAIDES, ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RULES: WITH A CAsE STUDY ON TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS (2000). 
101. For details see, for example, DEREK BEACH, THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTE-
GRATION: WHY AND WHEN EU INSTITUTIONS MATTER 214-44 (2005); DESMOND DINAN, 
EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION 271-79 (2004); Phedon Nicolaides, 
Preparing for Accession to the European Union: How to Estahlish Capacity for Effective and 
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The 1995 Commission's White Paper102 was the first attempt 
at a more comprehensive "pre-accession strategy." As the name 
suggests, the focus of the strategy was on preparations for partici-
pation in the internal market with its free flow of goods, services, 
people, and capital. The White Paper also acknowledged, how-
ever, that 
[A] merely formal transposition of legislation will not be 
enough to achieve the desired economic impact or to ensure 
that the internal market functions effectively after further en-
largement. Accordingly, equal importance is attached to the 
establishment of adequate structures for implementation and 
enforcement, which may be the more difficult task. 103 
However, when going through the White Paper with a fine 
comb, we find precious little that would deal with administrative 
and other structures. Instead, the focus is on the adoption of 
legislation in the different sectors relevant to the internal market 
and some advice on sequencing of that legislative revolution. 
This means the EU approached the CEECs as it would have ap-
proached just another Western candidate country, largely assum-
ing that once the good Western laws are in place everything else 
will soon follow. 104 
Specific elements in the pre-accession strategy were the Eu-
rope Agreements for association of the CEECs, and the so-called 
"structured relationship" of the candidate country governments 
with the institutions of the EU. 105 The focus of the Europe 
Credib/,e Application of EU Rules, in THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra 
note 85, at 43, 45-46. 
102. See Commission of the European Communities, Preparation of the Associated 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of 
the Union: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (95) 
163 Final (March 1995) [hereinafter White Paper], availab/,e at http:/ /aei.pitt.edu/ 
1120/01/easLenlarg_wp_COM_95_163.pdf; see also O'BRENNAN, supra note 90, at 28; 
Enlargement of the European Union: Summary of the White Paper from the Commis-
sion to the European Council, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlarge-
ment/index_en.htm. 
103. See White Paper, supra note 102, at 2. 
104. In subpoints 4.27 to 4.34, on exactly two pages, the White Paper laments the 
difficulties experienced by CEECs in creating the necessary administrative structures for 
the implementation and enforcement of EU law. Id. at 29-31. The bottom line is clearly 
that everything will be achieved gradually as the resources for hiring and training of 
qualified staff become available. For further analysis see, for example, MARc-A.NoRt 
GAUDISSART & Ao1NDA S1NNAEVE, The Role of the White Paper in the Preparation of the Eastern 
Enlargement, in ENLARGING THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 95, at 41. 
105. See Goebel, supra note 93, at 21-25; see, e.g., Europe Agreement establishing 
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Agreements was again on the development of market access, i.e., 
the expansion of the fundamental freedoms in the EU internal 
market plus supporting policies such as competition policy to 
the CEECs via reform of substantive law, and not on the develop-
ment of the legal cultures of the candidate countries. 106 Via the 
"structured relationship" and the chapters in the Europe Agree-
men ts about political dialogue and the creation of Association 
Councils some headway was made toward the integration of the 
highest level of government in the CEECs into the institutional 
and decision-making process in the EU.107 But this also did not 
suggest, let alone require, any specific changes of administrative 
law or culture in the candidate countries. 108 
The negotiations for membership were opened for the first 
five countries in 1998 and with the remaining candidates in 
1999.109 The different areas to be covered in the negotiations 
were divided into thirty-one chapters, 110 roughly parallel to the 
structure of the EC Treaty. 111 The CEEC governments then or-
ganized their national pre-accession strategies along the same 
outline and the Commission documented the progress of the ne-
gotiations in annual progress reports.11 2 Whenever a country 
an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part, OJ. L 68/3 (1998), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ /LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L: l 998:068:0003:0187: 
EN:PDF. 
106. See Goebel, supra note 93, at 21-25. 
107. See id. 
108. A comprehensive and critical analysis of the problems can be found in Frank 
Emmert, Administrative and Court &farm in Central and Eastern Europe, 9 EuR. L. J. 288 
(2003) [hereinafter Emmert, Administrative and Court &farm]. Various problems of ef-
fective application of (European Union) law in CEECs are also discussed in Emmert, 
supra note 94. 
109. See Goebel, supra note 93, at 30. 
110. See European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement, Enlargement of 
the European Union-Guide to the Negotiations Chapter by Chapter (2003), available at http:/ 
/ ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/ archives/ pdf/ enlargemen t_process/ fu ture_prospects/ 
negotiations/ eu 10 _bulgaria_romania/ negotiationsguide_en. pdf. 
111. See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, OJ. C 325/33 (2002), as amended by the Treaty of Nice, Mar. 10, 2001, OJ. 
C 80/1 (2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ,do?uri= 
OJ:C:2002:325:0001 :0184:EN:PDF. 
112. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Composite Paper: Re-
ports on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (1999) [here-
inaner Reports on Progress], available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ 
pdf/key_documents/1999/composite_en.pdf; Commission of the European Communi-
ties, Making a Success of Enlargement: Strategy Paper and Report on the Progress 
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had either accepted to apply all parts of the acquis communautaire 
covered by a specific chapter as of day one of membership in the 
EU or had obtained agreement by the Commission on selected 
transitional periods, the negotiations in that chapter were closed 
for that country.113 Most of the time, several but not all thirty-
one chapters were negotiated simultaneously. 114 In October 
2002, this screening and negotiating process was largely com-
pleted and the Commission recommended to the Council that 
accession agreements should be signed with eight of the ten 
CEECs with the goal of completing ratifications and actual acces-
sion before the elections to the European Parliament in June 
2004.11 5 Bulgaria and Romania were recommended for mem-
bership in 2007. 116 
During the negotiations it became increasingly clear that 
the CEECs had difficulties reforming their courts and public ad-
ministrations. This led to complaints by the Commission in the 
annual progress reports and the adoption of an Action Plan for 
Administrative and Judicial Capacity. 117 In addition to the finan-
cial support provided via PHARE, 118 the EU developed Acces-
Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries (2001), available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/ archives/ pdf/key _documen ts/2001 / strategy _en. pdf. 
113. See Reports on Progress, supra note 112, at 32. 
114. See id. at 41-48. 
115. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Opinion of 19 
February 2003 on the applications for accession to the European Union by the Czech 
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of 
Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, OJ. L 236/3 (2003), availa-
ble at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex U riServ /LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:236:0003: 
0004:EN:PDF. For the individual country reports, see Documents concerning the acces-
sion of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Repub-
lic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union, OJ. L 236/1 (2003), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/J0Html. 
do?textfield2=236&year=2003&Submit=Search&serie=L. 
116. See Commission of the European Communities, Monitoring report on the 
state of preparedness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania, COM (2006) 549 
Final (Sept. 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_docu-
men ts/2006/ sept/ report_bg_ro _2006_en. pdf. 
117. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the 
Commission on the Action Plan for administrative and judicial capacity, and the moni-
toring of commitments made by the negotiating countries in the accession negotia-
tions, COM (2002) 256 Final (June 2002), [hereinafter Action Plan for administrative and 
judicial capacity], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
COM:2002:0256:FIN:EN:PDF. 
118. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Financial support for agriculture 
2009] RUI.E OF LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 579 
sion Partnerships with the candidate countries, provided more 
and more money for re-development of physical facilities and 
training of staff of the public administrations, and encouraged 
bi-national twinning programs.119 
These measures have been summarized by Phedon Nico-
laides as "M&M solutions,"120 where the abbreviation stands for 
"money & men." In short, the EU works on the assumption that 
all it takes for the effective application of EU law in the new 
Member States is the appointment of sufficiently large numbers 
of sufficiently qualified staff and whatever resources they need. 
In contrast to the "official" emphasis on knowledge and ability, 
Nicolaides suggests a focus on the willingness of the people in the 
new Member States, from the top officials via the average admin-
istrators and judges, to the population in general, to comply with 
EU law and "rule of law."121 Roland Bieber has done some good 
but little noticed work on this matter. 122 He seems more opti-
mistic than me. As one of the participants on both sides of the 
room, I have criticized the various training and twinning pro-
grams before and won't repeat myself here .123 And why would I, 
the reader may ask. After all, the ten CEECs have all joined the 
EU in the meantime, the world has not come to an end, and 
isn't all's well that ends well? 
Well, apparently not. At least if the rapidly growing litera-
ture about different legal and administrative cultures in Eastern 
and Western Europe and the resulting compliance problems124 
was provided under the Special accession programme for agriculture and rural develop-
ment ("SAPARD") scheme and the structural funds were opened to the CEECs in the 
framework of the Pre-Accession Structural Instrument ("ISPA") scheme. See Council 
Regulation No. 1266/99, OJ. L 161/68 (1999), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:161:0068:0072:EN:PDF. 
119. See Action Plan for administrative and judicial capacity, supra note 117, at 6. 
120. See Nicolaides, supra note 101, at 44. 
121. See id.; see also Dionysia Tamvaki, The Copenhagen Criteria and the Evolution of 
Popular Consent to EU Norms: From Legality to Normative Justifiability in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, in SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND THE RuLE OF LAw? THE IMPACT OF EU ENLARGE-
MENT ON THE RULE OF LAw, DEMOCRACY AND CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST 
LEGAL ORDERS 149 (Wojciech Sadurski et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter SPREADING DEMOC-
RACY]. 
122. See Roland Bieber & Micaela Vaerini, Implementation and Compliance: Stimulus 
for New Governance Structures in the Accession Countries, in LAw AND GoVERNANCE IN AN 
ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 91, at 387. 
123. See Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform, supra note 108, at 305-06. 
124. See, e.g., Miroslav Beblavy, Management of Civil Service Reform in Central Europe, 
in MAsTERING DECENTRALIZATION AND PUBLIC AoMINISTRATION REFORMS IN CENTRAL AND 
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and the equally rapidly growing literature complaining about 
the courts in CEECs125 are any indicators, then "rule of law" is 
still wanting in this part of the world.126 And if this is indeed 
true, then it should be reason for reflection in Brussels why all 
the money that was spent over fifteen years on M&Ms has appar-
EASTERN EuROPE 55 (Gabor Peteri ed., 2002); Adam Czarnota, Barbarians ante portas or 
the Post-Communist Rule of Law in Post-Democratic European Union, in SPREADING DEMOC-
RACY, supra note 121, at 283; Michal Bobek, A New Legal Order, or a Non-.Existent One? 
Some (Early) Experiences in the Application of EU Law in Central Europe, 2 CROATIAN Y.B. 
EuR. L. & PoL'v 265, 269 (2006); Klaus H. Goetz, Making Sense of Post-Communist Central 
Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization ?, 8 J. EuR. Pus. PoL'Y 1032, 
1035 (2001); Klaus H. Goetz & Hellmut Wollmann, Governmentalizing Central Executives 
in Post-Communist Europe: A Four-Country Comparison, 8 J. EuR. Pus. PoL'v 864, 865 
(2001); Heather Grabbe, How Does Europeanization Affect GEE Governance? Conditionality, 
Diffusion and Diversity, 8]. EuR. Pus. PoL'v 1013, 1014-15 (200l);Joel Hellman, Institu-
tional Design in Post-communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, 7 E. EuR. CONST. REv. 
71, 72 (1998); Wade Jacoby, The Reality Behind the Potemkin Harmonization: Priest and 
Penitent-The European Union as a Force in Domestic Politics of Eastern Europe, 8 E. EuR. 
CoNST. REv. 63, 63-64 (1999); Zdenek Kuhn, Application of European Law in Central Euro-
pean Candidate Countries, 28 EuR. L. REv. 551, 553 (2003); Barbara Lippert, Gaby Um-
. bach & Wolfgang Wessels, Europeanization of GEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations 
as a Shaping Power, 8 J. EuR. Pus. PoL'v 980, 991 (2001); Sinisa Rodin, Discourse and 
Authority in European and Post-Communist Legal Culture, l CROATIAN Y.B. EuR. L. & PoL'Y 
l, 6-7 (2005); Ulrich Sedelmeier, After Conditionality: Post-Accession Compliance with EU 
Law in East Central Europe, 15 J. EuR. Pus. PoL'Y 806 (2008); Martina Spernbauer, 
Benchmarking, Safeguard Clauses and Verification Mechanisms-What's in a Name? Recent De-
velopments in Pre- and Post-accession Conditionality and Compliance with EU Law, 3 CROATIAN 
Y.B. EuR. L. & PoL'Y 273, 297-302 (2007); Dimiter Toshkov, In Search of the Worlds of 
Compliance: Culture and Transposition Performance in the European Union, 14 J. EuR. Pus. 
PoL'Y 933 (2007). 
125. See, e.g., Zdenek Kuhn, The Instrumental Use of Basic Rights by the Stalinist judici-
ary, in ABusE: THE DARK SmE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 99 (Andras Saj6 ed., 2006); 
Daniel Smilov, EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of Judicial Independence, in 
SPREADING DEMOCRACY, supra note 121, at 313; Sergio Bartole, Alternative Models of Judi-
cial Independence: Organizing the judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe, 7 E. EuR. CoNsT. 
REv. 62, 63 (1998); Tamara Eapeta, Courts, Legal Cultures and EU Enlargement, l CROA-
TIAN Y.B. EuR. L. & PoL'v 23, 23-24 (2005); Zdenek Kuhn, European Law in the Empires of 
Mechanical jurisprudence: The judicial Application of European Law in Central European Can-
didate Countries, l CROATIAN Y.B. EuR. L. & PoL'v 55, 56 (2005); Zdenek Kuhn, Worlds 
Apart: Western and Central European judicial Culture at the Onset of the European Enlarge-
ment, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2004); Open Soc'y Inst., Monitoring the EU Accession 
Process: Judicial Independence (2001), http://www.eumap.org/reports/2001/judi-
cial. 
126. For an interesting study on how corruption is blamed for everything that is 
not working properly in CEEC courts and administrations see Ivan Krastev, Corruption, 
Anti-Corruption Sentiments, and the Rule of Law, in RETHINKJNG THE RULE OF LAw AFTER 
COMMUNISM, supra note 96, at 323. My own reflections on the incompetence of some 
judges in CEECs that is widely misunderstood as corruption can be found in Frank 
Emmert, The Independence of judges: A Concept Often Misunderstood in Central and Eastern 
Europe, 3 EuR.j. L. REFORM 405,406 (2001). 
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ently not bought us all that much. Last but not least, if the EU 
would have to acknowledge that the strategies so far pursued 
(alone) did not achieve the desired results, it should ask itself 
two equally important questions: (1) what could be done in 
those countries that have already achieved membership in the 
EU to support development of "rule of law" and (2) how should 
the support strategies for current and future candidates, as well 
as neighbors, 127 be amended in light of these findings? 
127. Although European integration should per se be open to any European coun-
try, the EU has recently begun to divide the remaining European countries into "candi-
dates" and "potential candidates." See European Commission on Enlargement: Potential 
Candiate Countries, http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/ potential-candidate-countries/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). The actual and potential candidates are now 
benefitting from the new Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance ("IPA"). See Council 
Regulation No. 1085/2006/EC, OJ L 210/82 (2006), available at http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:210:0082:0093:EN:PDF. Pursuant 
to this document, there are three candidates (Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey) and four 
potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Serbia including Kosovo). The Eu-
ropean Neighborhood Policy, by contrast, covers a number of European countries (Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and a number of non-
European neighbors (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pales-
tine, Syria, and Tunisia). See Commission of the European Communities, European 
Neighborhood Policy: Strategy Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 
COM (2004) 373 Final (May 2004) available at http:/ /ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/ 
strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf. Support under the Technical Assistance and Informa-
tion Exchange ("TAIEX") program is available to the potential candidates, the neigh-
bors, and to the Turkish Cypriot Community and Russia. See About TAIEX, http:// 
taiex.ec.europa.eu/abouttaiex.asp?lang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). TAIEX typically 
provides Western experts to address challenges in the partner countries related to 
adoption and implementation of modem legislation that is compatible with EU goals 
and laws. See id. The bulk of the activities is done in the format of seminars, expert 
reports, and study visits. Very few if any of the activities specifically address the issues 
discussed in this Article. See EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TAIEX Acr1VI1Y REPORT (2007), 
http://taiex.ec.europa.eu/Library / ActRep2007 /T AIEXActivityReportEN. pdf; see also 
Commission of the European Communities, Opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee on a 'Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Rela-
tions with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,' COM (2003) 104 Final, ,r 4.7.2 (Mar. 
2004) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=0J:C:2004: 
080:0148:0155:EN:PDF; Commission of the European Communities, European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper from the Commission to the European Council, 
COM (2004) 373 Final, 25 (May 2004), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0373:FIN:EN:PDF. For scientific analysis of the 
neighborhood policy see, for example, Youri Borko, Russia and the EU in the 21st Century: 
Four Possible Scenarios of Relations, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra 
note 9, at 297; Sandra Lavenex, A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Integration Beyond Conditionality?, 15 J. EuR. Pue. PoL'Y 938 (2008); Dmitrijs 
Nemirovskis, Small But Precious: The Actual and Potential Direct Effect of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement Between the European Communities and the Russian Federation, 9 EuR. 
J. L. REFORM 553 (2007); Stephen White, Ian McAllister & Margot Light, Enlargement 
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III. OUTLOOK AND SUGGESTIONS 
[Vol. 32:551 
The EU is a not only a "Community based on the rule of 
law," 128 it is a Community based only or at least primarily on "rule 
of law." The EU neither has a network of EU or federal courts 
across the Member States like we find in the United States, nor 
its own administrative agencies and officials. With very narrow 
exceptions in competition law and anti-dumping, the EU relies 
on national legislatures and administrations to implement its law 
and it relies on national courts to oversee that implementa-
tion.129 The EU Commission and the Court of Justice can only 
perform very limited services as overseers of that national imple-
mentation. I would go as far as to say that without adequate im-
plementation and enforcement of EU law by the national au-
thorities, there is not only a problem, there is no longer an EU. 
Without adequate implementation and enforcement on the na-
tional level, European Union becomes European disunion and 
then European history. Consequently, the EU needs "rule of 
law" a lot more than it needs, for example, an internal market. 
The European Union can exist without an internal market but it 
cannot and does not exist without "rule of law." Therefore, the 
European Commission, instead of or at least in addition to the 
1995 White Paper "Preparation of the Associated Countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal 
Market of the Union"130 should have adopted a strategy and 
White Paper "Preparation for Participation of the CEECs in a 
Community Based on Rule of Law." Such a Paper and strategy 
are now thirteen years overdue. The closing paragraphs of the 
present Article shall be devoted to some suggestions-more as 
bullet points than elaborated arguments-for such a strategy. 
(1) On the level of constitutional reform of the CEECs, the 
and the New Outsiders, 40 J. Co MM ON MARKET STUD. 135 (2002); as well as a special issue 
of the European journal of Law Reform dedicated to the topic of Approximation of Laws 
by non-EU Countries to the EU Acquis, Special Issue Approximation to EU Law, 9 EuR. 
j. L. REFORM 357 (2007). 
128. See supra, notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
129. See Tanja A. Borzel, Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the Euro-
pean Commmision, in 6 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAw, PoLITIC.S, AND SoCIEIT 
197 (Tanja A. Borzel et al. eds., 2003). 
130. See Commission of the European Communities, Preparation of the Associated 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of 
the Union: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM (95) 
163 Final (May 1995). 
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EU should provide model clauses for the reform countries to be 
integrated into their constitutions. One article should clearly 
spell out the supremacy of EU law over national law,131 and an-
other should promulgate the three and a half essential princi-
ples of "rule of law," namely the requirement of legal basis, the 
requirement of legality, the requirement of effective judicial re-
view and the principle of administrative liability. Such a consti-
tutional amendment would solve the problem currently faced by 
a number of constitutional courts in the region which must 
often set aside unclear constitutional provisions to secure 
supremacy of EU law. 132 And it would provide the ultimate en-
dorsement of "rule of law" over rule of anybody or anything else. 
(2) On the level of legislative reform of the CEECs, a num-
ber of model clauses should be suggested for the law on the 
courts and the law on administrative procedure. The essential 
principles of "rule of law," as outlined in the preceding para-
graph, should be incorporated and fleshed out in both of these 
national laws. The law on the courts should also include provi-
sions about equality of arms of the parties before the courts but, 
more importantly, about adequate reasons to be provided for 
every judgment. The best way of making such a requirement 
operational is to provide for the automatic overruling and return 
for new examination and decision of any judgment that is not 
logically supported by its reasoning. Last but not least, all judg-
ments must be published and accessible for critical review by the 
media and the interested public. The latter principle is as im-
portant as the requirement that hearings should normally be 
public, which we take rather for granted. The law on administra-
tive procedure, furthermore, should ideally provide for an inter-
nal review procedure for administrative decisions analogous to 
the very successful German Widerspruchsverfahren. 133 Under this 
131. And whilst we are at it, why not suggest also a clause that clarifies the relation-
ship between international law, in particular the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with national law. 
132. See Anneli Albi, Selected judgments fry CEE Constitutional Courts: Lessons on How 
(Not) to Amend Constitutions?, 3 CROATIAN Y.B. EuR. L. & PoL'v 39 (2007). 
133. The German Widersprnchsveifahren has its legal basis in Verwaltungsgericht-
sordnung [VwGO) [Code of Administrative Procedure) Jan. 21, 1960, at §§ 68-73 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/vwgo/gesamt. 
pdf. For further information see NIGEL G. FosTER, GERMfu'-1 LEGAL SYSTEM & LAws 174-
75 (2d ed. 1996); FRIEDHELM HuFEN, VERWALTUNGSPROZESSRECHT (7th ed. 2008); HEN-
NING JADE, VERWALTUNGSVERFAHREN, WIDERSPRUCHSVERFAHREN, VERWALTUNGSPROZESS 
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procedure, anybody who is dissatisfied with an administrative de-
cision or the unresponsiveness of the administration to a request 
or application has to pass through an internal administrative re-
view before being able to bring the matter before the courts.134 
For best results, the review should be done by the next higher 
level inside the administration and a time limit should be pro-
vided for that authority to provide a reasoned decision to the 
applicant either rejecting or accepting the complaint. 135 Many 
administrative mistakes can be rectified quickly and inexpen-
sively with such a procedure. 136 At the very least, even if the ap-
plicant does not receive satisfaction, she receives a reasoned 
opinion on the basis of which she can now decide whether or 
not to take the matter to the courts. 137 Along a similar vein, the 
countries which have not done so yet should be strongly en-
couraged to create ombuds-person positions and review proce-
dures for complaints of arbitrary or inefficient behavior of ad-
ministrative officials, including corrupt and similar improper 
conduct. 
(3) and ( 4) On the level of administrative and court reform 
in CEECs, the EU and its various training and facility improve-
ment programs have achieved much in practical terms. Unfortu-
nately, the mindset of the administrators and judges is some-
times still lagging behind the modernization of their offices and 
computers. I have written in detail about the practical problems 
of retraining officials who have worked for decades under the 
former Communist systems and may simply not be able to 
change the way they work. 138 Although it may be difficult to 
change some of these officials, it would be easy enough to im-
prove the training methods and to provide added incentives for 
the participants not only to attend but to obtain measurable and 
demonstrated qualifications via exams and diplomas. 
(5) Last but not least, on the level oflegal education reform 
in CEECs, the EU has done virtually nothing to help and the 
(4th ed. 2006); WoLF-R0DIGER ScHENKE, VERWALTUNGSPROZESSRECHT 213-37 (llth ed. 
2007); WoLF-R0DIGER ScHENKE & FERDINAND 0. KoPP, VwGO KoMMENTAR (15th ed. 
2007). 
134. See FosTER, supra note 133, at 174-75. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. 
138. See Emmert, Administrative and Court Reform, supra note 108, at 305-06. 
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results are accordingly very mixed. "Reproducing Incompe-
tence" is a slogan that has been used with regard to one of the 
most venerable institutions in Central Europe, the Faculty of 
Law of Charles University in Prague. 139 This neglect by the West 
and trial and error approach in the East is particularly dis-heart-
ening because it means that we continue to graduate lawyers in 
many places who carry in themselves, like an indelible genetic 
code, the methodological incompetence of the Communist era. 
Although it is true that the Member States have not conferred 
any powers on the EU to adopt binding legislation in the area of 
education, there should be no problem with the EU promoting 
a set of best practice criteria to support the CEECs in their re-
form efforts. And indeed the models for promotion of excel-
lence in higher education are not hard to find. The reader 
needs to look no further than to the United States and the 
United Kingdom where strict evaluation and accreditation pro-
cedures administered by external peers and professional organi-
zations are constantly forcing the universities and (law) schools 
to not only abide by the letter of the applicable laws but to pur-
sue excellence via meritocratic hiring and promotion proce-
dures, constant improvement of work and study conditions, ad-
ministrations at the service of the students and the faculty, and 
many other efforts.140 The finest example for adaptation of such 
a system in the CEECs can be found in Lithuania where today 
three successful law schools are competing with three rather dif-
ferent philosophies and approaches to higher education after 
having passed through a rigorous accreditation procedure rely-
ing heavily on international experts and expertise. 141 This is not 
139. See Aviezer Tucker, Reproducing Incompetence: The Constitution of Czech Higher 
Education, 9 E. EuR. CONST. R. 94, 94 (2000); see also Edi Spaho, Dire Straits: Albanian 
Legal Education, 9 E. EuR. CONST. R. 90 (2000) (discussing problems with the Albanian 
legal system in its post-communist era). 
140. U.S. law schools must be accredited by the American Bar Association 
("ABA"). See American Bar Association, Accreditation Process, http://www.abanet.org/ 
legaled/accreditation/acinfo.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). Lawyers practicing in the 
United Kingdom must belong to one of four professional organizations called "inns of 
court" which also set educational requirements. See Lincoln Inn's History, http:/ /www. 
lincolnsinn.org.uk/inns.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); see, e.g., Gray's Inn, http:/ /www. 
graysinn.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=section&id=38&Itemid=858 (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
141. See Globalex, A Guide to the Lithuanian Legal System, http://www.nyulaw-
global.org/Globalex/Lithuania.htm#_lO._Legal_Education (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
For more information on the Lithuanian system of evaluation and accreditation of insti-
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rocket science but in light of the fact that higher education in 
the EU, or rather on the European continent, has long given up 
its claim to global leadership, 142 it should probably not surprise 
that we cannot seem to get it right. Jean Monnet supposedly 
said, "[i]f I were starting over, I would begin with culture." 143 I 
guess today he might well say he should have started with (legal) 
education .... 
Finally, if the approach suggested here should bear some 
useful fruit in Central and Eastern Europe, it may well be worth 
trying in other parts of the world, including but not limited to 
the old and new neighbors of the EU. 
tutions of higher education see Lithuanian Centre for Quality Assessment in Higher 
Education, Rules of Quality Assessment for Institutions of Research and Higher Educa-
tion, http://www.skvc.lt/old/wwwskvc/en/rules.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
142. Reference is made to the well known London Times World University Rank-
ings. For the most recent edition see THE TIMES HIGHER EDuc. SUPPLEMENT & QuAC-
QUARELLI SYMONDS, WoRLD UNIVERSITI' RANKINGS 4 (Nov. 9, 2007), availabl,e at http:// 
www.timeshighereducation.co. uk/Magazines/THES/ graphics/WorldRankings2007. 
pdf. Among the 200 top universities in the world, we find no less than fifty-seven U.S. 
and thirty-two U.K. universities, including twenty of the world's top twenty-five universi-
ties, whereas not a single continental European institution even made it into the top 
twenty-five. Id. 
143. "Si c'etait d refaire, je commerwrais par la culture." Both the French original and 
the English translation are here taken fromjuDT, supra note 2, at 701. Professor Henri 
Rieben, the founder and long term director of the Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe 
and hence in a way the top curator of the personal archives of Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schuman, once told me that the quote is probably apocryphal. However, as our Italian 
friends would say, si none vero, e hen trovato (if it's not true, it's well invented). 
